The category of witness has acquired great importance since the Second Vatican Council as a way of expressing the Christian modality of dialogue with other cultures and religions. To understand its theological character one must bear in mind that its meaning covers two aspects that are different even though profoundly united.
On the one hand, the witness of individual Christians and ecclesial communities allows men to perceive the ‘correspondence’ of the Revelation of Jesus Christ with their elementary human experience. In this sense, witness is a category that expresses the credibility of the Church because it makes credible the faith that the Church transmits.
At a second level of meaning, and more at the root of things, witness is a category that is essential in formulating the very structure of Revelation and its transmission: Holy Scripture expresses its singular quality because it is attested to by the life of the Church, Holy Tradition rests upon authoritative apostolic witness, and the spread of the Gospel takes place through the living witness of Christians, unto saintliness and martyrdom. In this second case, witness in a specific sense is a sign of Revelation because it channels the faith (1).
Some observations made by J.E. Ratzinger and H.U. von Balthasar on the method of dialogue with other religious or philosophical positions prefigured the importance of witness. In his famous dialogue with Habermas, the then Cardinal Ratzinger proposed a diagnosis of Christian faith in relation to the cultures of the world: ‘[Both Christianity and the Western rationalist tradition] must, however, recognise, de facto that they are only accepted by, and even understandable for, a part of mankind’.
The other cultures and religions seem to call into question the ‘universal claim of the Christian message’. Ratzinger considered that a consequence of this was the ‘non-universality in fact’ of the Christian faith. Thus, the Cardinal went on, ‘a formula for the interpretation of the rational, ethical or religious world does not exist on which everyone agrees and which could, therefore, support everything; anyway it is at the present time unachievable’ (2).
Ratzinger did not think it was possible to identify a formulation of ethical or religious thought that could prevail universally over other positions. In his judgement it was not realistic to think that there was a sort of doctrinal corpus that could manage, as such, to win credence for its claim to universal truth amongst others, the believers of other religions or non-believers. Nor could Christianity claim a priori such universal recognition.
In this diagnosis by Ratzinger we already find a first justification for the need for witness as a modality for the communication of the faith that is not confined to an attempt to identify a general doctrinal formula.
Von Balthasar also asked himself about the suitable ways of presenting the Christian faith. This Swiss theologian argued that today Christianity appears in the eyes of the world as a possibility that is side by side with others and that it cannot be imposed but has to demonstrate its credibility, reasonably, without forcing the freedom of the interlocutor. A possible modality of presentation in his view was that of organising its arguments and discussing those of other interlocutors. In this way, he argued, one would achieve a kind of hierarchy in participation in the truth, in agreement with the thesis that argues that ‘who sees more, is more deeply right’ and is able to supplement his own broader truth with the truthful aspects of other positions.
In the view of this theologian from Basle this method – which he called the ‘supplementary’ method has certain limitations. On the one hand, the attempt to ‘see more’ can clash with positions that do not want to be supplemented or even reject the criterion of ‘seeing more’ because they believe that it is better for man to forgo entering the depths of thought about God or the cosmos. But, secondly, there arises a difficulty that derives from the very nature of Christian Revelation. The attempt to ‘see more’ is said not to lead to the singular event of Jesus Christ so much as to an ‘absolute knowledge’ of a Hegelian character which would absorb the Christian faith. For this Swiss theologian, the price to pay in this attempt was truly too high: one would lose ‘the freedom of God in His self-revelation and His inconceivable love that is freely given’. The Christian claim cannot be conceived by Christians themselves solely in terms of an all-embracing system of truth within which the aspects of truth possessed by others can be placed, without them running the risk of obscuring the free character of the salvific initiative of God Himself’ [cf. Fides et Ratio n. 46].
However, von Balthasar, is keen to clarify that the rejection of this attempt to legitimate Christianity through an accumulation of rational arguments does not in any way imply ‘abandoning oneself to the adventure of an option without a rational foundation’ (3). Theology has always sought to conceive the Christian message in non-irrational or voluntaristic terms and has always felt the need to provide rational grounds for its hope [cf. 1Pt 3:15]. There can be no doubt, therefore, that faith brings with it its own arguments which must be able to be communicated. Thus Balthasar argues that these aspects of the ‘supplementary method’ should be conserved. But on its own this method cannot reach the goal that is desired because it cannot provide rational grounds for the structure of a Revelation which is sovereignly free. The key change in Revelation was the free event of Jesus Christ which addressed the freedom of every man and which cannot be translated exhaustively into a system of ideas. One would need, therefore, a method for the communication of faith that is able to avoid this risk of rationalism without falling into an irrationalistic reduction.
Thus to overcome the attempt at a solely doctrinal comparison with cultural or religious positions, and to invoke the co-original move of freedom together with reason, the category of witness can be determining. Balthasar argues that what is at stake is not simply the choice of a modality for the communication of faith but the understanding itself of the Christian Fact.
The Second Vatican Council
Whereas the First Vatican Council had characterised the Church by using a category of witness understood as a sign of credibility [DH 3013], in the Second Vatican Council this appears in an even more relevant way. In Dei Verbum the categories of ‘witness/testimony’ [nn. 3, 4, 17, 18, 19] or ‘witnesses’ [n. 19] or ‘to witness’ [n. 8] refer to the modality of transmission of Revelation, in an inseparable set of actions and word, as certainly happens in the case of Jesus but also in the case of the apostles, and as is reflected in inspired Writings or in the Holy Fathers. It was emphasised that for the Second Vatican Council witness/testimony had a strong Christological/ revelational meaning because ‘divine testimony was extended in apostolic testimony and remains in the testimony of the Church. Thus witness is revelation of the activity of Christ and the apostles and is the transmission of Revelation in the tradition of the Church’ (4). This perspective acquires a decisive relevance because it points to the testifying modality specific to Revelation and its transmission.
In harmony with Dei Verbum, Gaudium et Spes presented witness in the context of the problem of atheism. Specifically when one wants to point out the type of dialogue that is suitable to reach those men who are most ‘distant’, Gaudium et Spes proposes witness as a remedy to deal with atheism: ‘For it is the function of the Church, led by the Holy Spirit Who renews and purifies her ceaselessly, to make God the Father and His Incarnate Son present and in a sense visible. This result is achieved chiefly by the witness of a living and mature faith, namely, one trained to see difficulties clearly and to master them. Many martyrs have given luminous witness to this faith and continue to do so. This faith needs to prove its fruitfulness by penetrating the believer’s entire life, including its worldly dimensions, and by activating him toward justice and love, especially regarding the needy’ [n. 21]. Through witness to faith the Mystery of the triune God is made present and visible, that is to say one assures the transmission of Revelation through the witness of a mature faith, that faith which has been formed adequately and which involves the whole life of the believer.
We find important references to witness in other documents of the Second Vatican Council as well. The Declaration Nostra Aetate emphasises that ‘witness of faith and the Christian life’ is an inescapable dimension of every dialogue with believers of other religions [n. 2]. Ad Gentes appreciates witness, above all in n. 11 where there is offered almost a list of its characteristic features. It is said that to bear witness to Christ it is necessary to form relationships of esteem and charity with men, to be living active members of the human group in which one lives, to take part in the affairs of human existence and cultural and social life, to know about national traditions, to strive to stimulate the desire for truth and charity revealed by God, to know the men with whom one lives, to engage in dialogue sincerely and patiently, and to illuminate the riches of peoples with the light of the Gospel (5).
The Magisterium Since the Second
Vatican Council: Some Fundamental Texts The Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi of Paul VI describes with simplicity the dynamic of witness in the process of evangelisation and then refers to the explicit message of the Gospel without which witness runs the risk of remaining ambiguous. It is in this text that Pope Montini advances the phrase which has by now become famous: ‘Modern man listens more willingly to witnesses than to teachers, and if he does listen to teachers, it is because they are witnesses’ [n. 41].
The Relatio finalis of the Extraordinary Synod of Bishops of 1985 observed that ‘evangelisation is carried out through witnesses. A witness bears witness not only through words but also through his own life. We must not forget that in Greek witness is martyrium’.
With respect specifically to inter-religious dialogue and the mission of the Church, we may refer to the encyclical of John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio (6), which proposes witness as the ‘first form of evangelisation’ [n. 42] and identifies it with the life itself of the individual missionary, of the Christian family, and of the Church. In order to identify witness better it refers to experience as distinct from doctrine, and to lives and facts as distinct from theories. It also says that it is to be found in approaches and actions, such as care for the person and charity towards the poorest. In this way a free-giving is expressed that contrasts with the selfishness of men and provokes questions that open up a pathway towards God. Immediately afterwards [n. 43], stress is laid on the need for an explicit proclaiming of Christ the Saviour and this is seen as a permanent priority of mission. The approach of Redemptoris Missio to witness does not seem to differ very much from the approach to be found in Evangelii Nuntiandi, both as regards the propositive power of this category and with respect to its tendency to be identified with action, to which is added the explicit speech of preaching. The question about the understanding of the categories of experience, lives and facts, approaches and actions, in so far as they tend to be distinct from doctrine, theory and words, remains open.
In the Magisterium of Benedict XVI, emphasis is laid on the idea of witness that appears in the apostolic exhortation Sacramentum Caritatis. Within the context of the Eucharist, the Pope teaches that ‘We become witnesses when, through our actions, words and way of being, Another makes himself present. Witness could be described as the means by which the truth of God's love comes to men and women in history, inviting them to accept freely this radical newness. Through witness, God lays himself open, one might say, to the risk of human freedom. Jesus himself is the faithful and true witness [cf. Rev 1:5; 3:14], the one who came to testify to the truth [cf. Jn 18:37] [n. 85]. Here there is an echo of Dei Verbum with its Christological/revelational meaning of witness.
A Potentially Ambiguous Category
As one can see, the recent Magisterium is unanimous in attributing great relevance to witness. Renewal is perceived in the appeal to an existential modality of evangelisation in order not to reduce to a mere doctrinal preaching detached from the daily experience of men and their interests. The documents require an overall Christian proposal, one that is captured in the famous phrase ‘modern man listens more willingly to witnesses than to teachers’. Now, the question of the nature of witness is not solved in a definitive way and one should not be amazed if some documents warn about the risk of an ambiguity. This is justified where witness is understood only as a reason for credibility but it is overcome when the category expresses its Christological/revelational character. In these documents one can identify both uses of the category, which refer to each other, but do not coincide tout court. When it is understood as an existential and not merely doctrinal modality of presenting the faith to believers, it is more ‘witness of life’, which is identified with actions or approaches (works of charity, service, lifestyle…). It seems to have the goal of generating questions in men and thus of opening up the road to a further moment of preaching. The power of a witness provokes surprise and prepares someone to receive the news of Christ that arrives from further preaching (in more technical terms, one is dealing here with a reason for credibility). Because these actions are not in themselves evident, reference is thus made to the completion of this first dimension with the explicit preaching proposed by words. This line prevails above all in Ad Gentes and in documents that deal with missions (Evangelii Nuntiandi, Redemptoris Missio) and inter-religious dialogue.
On the other hand, witness is seen as a modality to actualise Revelation itself and its transmission (in technical terms one is dealing with a sign of Revelation). This is the dominant approach above all in Dei Verbum, in Gaudium et Spes, and in Sacramentum Caritatis. In these texts, witness (of Jesus, of the apostles, of Christians) refers both to the works and to the words of the authoritative witness with an intrinsic reference to the divine truth that is testified to in them. Perhaps in this case one would speak about ‘witness of faith’ because evangelisation is actuated through witnesses, beginning with Jesus, the faithful witness [cf. Ap 1:5]. Here witness is not confined to provoking questions on the part of the interlocutor but makes the answers of divine Revelation visible and after a certain fashion present. A witness, with the set of his works and words, is he who connects the historically located freedom of man with the Infinite Freedom of God. He is a ‘third’ between the two, in line with the etymology of testis which comes from ter-stis (he who is between one and the other). In this case, witness not only does not run the risk of ambiguity, but, on the contrary, emerges as the highest expression of the communication of revealed truth through the full exposition of the witness, unto the free handing over of the truth, as happens in the case of saints and in evident fashion with martyrs (7).
Why, then, do the documents of the Magisterium warn us about an ambiguity? There are at least two reasons. On the one hand, the theologies that understood witness primarily as a reason for credibility (in apologetics before the Second Vatican Council for example), tended to reduce it to an ‘example’ of an ethical character. It was not yet an announcing (preaching), an explicit proclamation that provoked an act of true and specific faith. Credibility understood in these terms, in fact, was almost a premise that disposed to the theological act and made it reasonable, but it was not a part of it. On the other hand, however, some trends after the Second Vatican Council also fostered a certain ambiguity. For the sake of convenience they can be placed under the label of theologies of ‘anonymous witness’, at the root of which one may locate the approach of Rahner who, indeed, had great influence on inter-religious dialogue (8).
To summarise: this German theologian identified the theological essence of witness with the immediateness of the divine, in processes that seem to be purely human as well. Witness is not a dimension added to the action but its very form. When there is not an explicit (categorical) religious statement, witness conserves its theological value if the human action involves a total self-giving to God, independently of knowledge or otherwise of the event of Christ. The necessary presence of supernatural grace is assumed transcendentally. It is not difficult to understand that although for Rahner witness always implies the totality of the self in front of its destiny and is not reduced to an ethical action, because he attributes to the delivering up of oneself an absolute meaning, inevitably one must then add a word of religious explanation.
A Category for Philosophical/Theological Exploration
In the face of these risks of reduction, the category of witness should be explored philosophically and theologically in a Christological/revelational sense, as taught by Dei Verbum, to supplement that meaning with the dimension of credibility. Indeed, what is at stake is presenting a view of Revelation as a singular and free event of the communication of God in history, which cannot be reduced to the description of a doctrinal or ethical system [cf. Deus caritas est n.1 and n.12]. And this task requires a theoretical exploration of the revealed truth and its reception by the believer (9).
The innovation of the Second Vatican Council as regards the conception at the level of witness of Revelation goes, therefore, beyond its simple existential value in order to stress its irreducible historical/Christological character. The best exponents of theology after the Second Vatican Council followed this approach, whereas, instead the anthropological/transcendental thesis demonstrated its weaknesses.
Undoubtedly witness includes the existentiality and the wholeness of the act of faith which involves life and makes possible a credibility that is not reduced to a comparison of doctrinal or moral arguments. In this way there is an appreciation of Rahner’s concern to see witness as a form of the act, and there is a move towards the emphasis of Ratzinger and Balthasar on moving beyond an attempt to find a general formula in the ‘supplementary method’, thanks to a kind of witness that connects finite freedom with Infinite Freedom.
A witness, and Christ first of all, provokes with his totality of his life, unto death, the historically situated freedom of the other, referring it to the adoption of a stance towards oneself and God who addresses us in history. There can be no Christian witness that does not imply the relationship with the truth of the Absolute, that does not impose a constant interpretation of the historical sign of revelation (witness) to truth, and simultaneously to an interpretation of oneself.
In this theological exploration one can find interesting convergences with contemporary philosophies, of a hermeneutic, phenomenological or personalist kind, that offer accurate analyses of the human act of bearing witness, both in the common and the juridical sense, and of the singular witness-bearing character of a work of art (Hem¬merle, Ricœur, Gadamer, Lévinas, Nabert...). And one can equally incorporate the parallels with the perspective of the witness of Christ and the apostles, found in the valuable studies on biblical witness in both the New and the Old Testament (Ricœur, Chrétien, Beauchamp...) (10).
(1) Cf. S. Pié-ninot, La teología fundamental (Secretariado Trinitario, Salamanca 2006), pp. 572 ss.; P. Sequeri, L’idea della fede (Glossa, Milan 2002), pp. 126 ss.
(2) J. Ratzinger, ‘Ragione e fede. Scambio reciproco per un’etica commune’, in J. Habermas and J. Ratzinger, Ragione e fede in dialogo. Le idee di Benedetto XVI a confronto con un grande filosofo (Marsilio, Venice 2005).
(3) H.U. Von Balthasar, Epilogo (Jaca Book, Milan1994), pp. 97-98.
(4) N. Cotugno, ‘La testimonianza della vita del popolo di Dio, segno di Rivelazione alla luce del Concilio Vaticano II’, in R. Fisichella (ed.) Gesù rivelatore (Piemme, Casale Monferrato 1988), pp. 227-240.
(5) Cf. A. Steinke, Christliches Zeugnis als Integration von Erfahrung und Weitergabe des Glaubens (Echter Verlag, Würzburg 1997).
(6) The documents of the Secretariat for Non-Christians: L’atteggiamento della Chiesa difronte ai seguaci di altre religioni (10-V-1984) and Dialogo e annuncio (published jointly with
the Congregation for the Evangelisation of Peoples, 19-V-1991) do not explore the category of witness.
(7) Cf. A. Scola, Freedom, Truth and Salvation, in M. Serrett (ed.), The Uniqueness and Universality of Jesus Christ (William B. Eerdamans Publishing Company, Gran Rapids Michigan - Cambridge UK 2004), pp. 1-5.
(8) K. Rahner, ‘Interprétation théologique du témoignage’, in E. Castelli (ed.), La testimonianza (Cedam, Padua 1972), pp. 173-187.
(9) See the recent ‘Nota dottrinale su alcuni aspetti dell’evangelizzazione’, by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (3-XII-07), n. 1 and n. 4.
(10) In addition to the volume by Castelli mentioned above, see also the monographic issue of Philosophie 88 (2005).