While the regime pours resources into regional ambitions, domestic discontent grows: poverty, repression, and a generation that rejects the politicization of religion. Interview with exiled Iranian intellectual Mohsen Kadivar
Last update: 2025-05-20 12:11:13
Mohsen Kadivar graduated in Qom with a degree in ijtihad in 1997. He got his Ph.D. in Islamic philosophy and theology from Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran in 1999. Since summer 1987 Kadivar has begun expressing skepticism towards the validity of certain major policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After several restrictions, he was imprisoned for 18 months in Evin prison. He then moved to the US and is currently research professor of Islamic Studies at the Duke University. For his full biography, visit his official website.
Interview by Claudio Fontana
Professor Kadivar, what’s the feeling of common Iranian people regarding the Islamic Republic?
First of all, I have to say that I have been in exile since 2008; I’m not an eyewitness to events in Iran, but I have been following the news closely. The major concern of most Iranians, 46 years after the Revolution, is to enjoy the convenience of a normal life—a very minimal demand. They do not tolerate government interference in their private lives. They want justice, freedom, the rule of law, and respect for public opinion. They hate discrimination. They want democracy.
Iranians are tired of institutional corruption and an inefficient government. They suffer under dictatorship and despotism, especially when it is exercised in the name of religion, Islam. Before the Revolution, they were subjected to a secular, Western-leaning tyranny. After the Revolution, they have been subjected to an anti-imperialist religious tyranny. They want good relations with all countries in the world.
Are you saying that Iranians still have a positive view of the West as well, even after American withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement and the reimposition of sanctions?
Of course, they are not happy with the aggression and hegemonic policies of great powers such as the United States—and, in the past, the UK, the Soviet Union, and Russia. Iranians deeply value sovereignty and independence.
Iranians, especially the lower classes, suffer under the back-breaking U.S. sanctions, economic pressures, and high inflation. These sanctions impact the lower classes far more than the theocratic regime or the IRGC.
Almost all Iranians have no issue with religion when it is voluntary, but they oppose the government’s attempts to enforce religious laws. Young people, in particular, emphasize cultural and social freedoms, as well as personal lifestyle choices.
The major problem in Iran is the domination of an ideological minority over a diverse society. This minority—about 15 to 20 percent—are hardliners, close-minded, and have a very superficial understanding of Islam. Many Iranians refer to them as the local Taliban. There is a significant gap between their worldview and that of the majority.
How would you describe the current political landscape in Iran?
It consists of a spectrum: from non-political traditionalists to moderates, reformists, and transformationalists (Tahavvol-khahan), which refers to radical reformists. Reformists aim to change the Islamic Republic from within the framework of the government, while radical reformists aim to change even the Constitution and remove theocracy peacefully. At the end of this spectrum are people with no formal political affiliations. It’s important to note that this spectrum is fluid. We don’t have reliable statistics on the size or influence of each of these four groups.
The regime has dismantled or significantly weakened almost all independent political parties. As a result, instead of functioning parties, the political scene revolves around influential political figures, whose activities are monitored by the security services or the IRGC. Many major political figures are under various forms of repression: former President Mohammad Khatami is under restrictions; last month, Mehdi Karroubi was released after 15 years of house arrest, while others, such as Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard, remain under house arrest. Meanwhile, figures like Seyyed Mostafa Tajzadeh are still in prison.
Could you help us understand the situation within the reformist camp, especially after the election of Masoud Pezeshkian?
There was no consensus within the reformist camp about participating in the tightly controlled 2024 elections. Those who chose to take part followed this logic: Pezeshkian was far better than Saeed Jalili, a hardliner. Among the approved candidates, Pezeshkian was seen as the best option.
In Iran, elections happen in two stages: first, a selection by the Guardian Council, and then the public election. People understood that Pezeshkian was directly approved by the Supreme Leader to ease the national crisis. The Leader seems to have recognized that his hardliner allies are incapable of solving Iran’s problems. However, he has yet to understand that the core issue is not about one government or another—it is the theocratic system itself, the velayat-e faqih, and its leadership.
So far, Pezeshkian has not added to Iran’s problems, but I am not optimistic that he can solve any of them. The issues lie beyond his authority.
Is this the reason why in 2021 you said that the Islamic Republic was transforming into the Islamic State of Iran?
The Islamic Republic of Iran functioned as a competitive electoral authoritarian regime from 1979 until 2019. In early 2020, it shifted into a non-competitive electoral authoritarian regime.
At that time, there were several signs suggesting that the Islamic Republic was on the path to becoming an Islamic State of Iran.
Then, in May 2024, President Ebrahim Raisi died in a highly suspicious helicopter crash. This led the Supreme Leader to reconsider his policy of a non-competitive electoral system. He decided to revert to a weaker form of electoral competition. In effect, he postponed the transition to a fully non-electoral authoritarian regime—what could be called an Islamic State of Iran—to an unknown point in the future. Such a transformation is unlikely to happen during his lifetime.
Khamenei realized that the policy of eliminating electoral competition had failed. Voter turnout in a second-round runoff would likely have dropped below 30%, so he abandoned the plan. Masoud Pezeshkian’s candidacy and victory were the result of this decision.
Still, citizens are only allowed to vote for candidates pre-approved by the Guardian Council, which is controlled by the Leader. Since at least 2020, no candidate opposing the Leader’s will has been permitted to run. After Raisi’s suspicious death, new elections were held, and a reformist—though a weak one—was allowed to win.
So, is the collapse of the Islamic Republic the only way to bring about significant change?
If the Leader would at least refrain from interfering in every aspect of the country’s affairs, meaningful change could still happen. A similar shift occurred in the UK several centuries ago, when the monarchy moved from absolute power to a symbolic role.
What Iran needs is a figurehead Leader, not an interventionist one. If the Leader accepts such a role, then the President could actually govern the country. Right now, it’s the opposite: the Leader is the true ruler, while the President is merely symbolic. We need to reverse that arrangement.
Is there any intellectual reconsideration within Iran regarding its role in the Middle East?
That’s a great question. From my understanding, most Iranians today overwhelmingly prioritize national interests. They believe the government’s foremost responsibility is to satisfy the needs of its own citizens—meeting their daily requirements, improving welfare, and eliminating poverty. Only after fulfilling these domestic obligations could the government consider supporting oppressed groups abroad.
Unfortunately, the government’s priorities appear reversed: first comes support for the oppressed in the region, then comes addressing the needs of the Iranian people. Yet at least one-third of Iranians live below the poverty line. The government’s first obligation should be to lift its own people out of poverty.
While regional resistance against Zionism or imperialism may have diplomatic legitimacy, it must be approved by the actual representatives of the people in Parliament and grounded in a realistic understanding of the national budget.
Almost all Shiite authorities in the seminaries—especially in Qom—support prioritizing the daily needs and welfare of Iranians over regional adventures. The government of the Islamic Republic must listen to this view. Gaining the satisfaction of Iranian citizens is more important than advancing regional ambitions.
In truth, the Islamic Republic often uses anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist policies instrumentally, as a political tool, while neglecting the fundamental duty of ensuring the well-being and satisfaction of its own citizens.
Do you think that new leadership could emerge from the seminaries—for example, Qom—after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei passes away? Or will there be a clash between the IRGC and other powerful figures?
It’s very hard to predict. According to the Iranian Constitution, the Assembly of Experts is supposed to choose the next Leader. They have a secret committee that maintains a shortlist of three candidates, and I believe the selection will come from that list. But only the current Leader truly knows who the successor might be. As far as I understand, none of these candidates are prominent Shiite authorities from the Qom seminary. That makes sense: the regime is not seeking jurisprudential expertise but administrative experience, and that is not found among traditional jurists. Therefore, if we want to identify a potential successor, we should look within the Leader’s inner circle, not among the clerics in Qom.
What could be the IRGC’s reaction to such a transition?
I’ve been asked this many times, but any answer is speculative—we simply don’t know. We do know that Khamenei himself went through this process when succeeding Ayatollah Khomeini. Back then, Khamenei played an active role in selecting Ayatollah Montazeri as successor years before Khomeini’s death—but that plan ultimately failed. Given that experience, it’s likely that no official successor will be publicly named this time. Most probably, Khamenei will leave a will and name his successor at the very end.
Will the Assembly of Experts be bypassed?
Yes, the real decision will likely take place outside the Assembly of Experts. Today, Iran has two centers of power: the Leader’s Office and the IRGC. These two forces are cooperating, even if there are some internal differences between them.
The only prediction I feel confident making is this: the next Leader will need to have administrative experience. This means the candidate may come from among former presidents or former heads of the judiciary. The Shiite authorities lack the political authority, power, and experience for such a role.
However, potential candidates like Hassan Rouhani and Sadegh Larijani have already been sidelined, and Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi has passed away. The current head of the judiciary does not appear qualified for the position. So, we are left waiting.
What are your reflections on the broader implications of recent events in Palestine, especially after October 7, 2023, and the war that followed?
Contrary to how many Western media portray it, the story of Palestine did not begin on October 7, 2023. To understand the current situation, we must go back to 1948 and even to 1917. Without that historical context, we cannot grasp the reality in the region.
The Palestinian issue is rooted in a conflict over land. It involves the original inhabitants—Jews, Christians, and Muslims—on one side, and Jewish immigrants influenced by the secular Zionist ideology, supported by the UK and the US, on the other. From the Zionist point of view—which is distinct from Judaism—Palestinians have no right to live in their own land. We’ve heard this openly expressed by various Israeli officials, some of whom have referred to Palestinians as “human animals.” In this logic, any Palestinian who resists occupation, apartheid, or population displacement can be killed—and many have been—including children, infants, women, and the elderly. They justified this horrendous crime as killing Amaleks!
What has happened over the last 18 months is simply a continuation of Zionist crimes over the past century. I unequivocally condemn the killing of any innocent person, regardless of nationality or religion.
Palestinians have the right to their land, their country, and their sovereignty—this is affirmed by international law. The right to self-defense does not belong exclusively to Jews. According to rulings by the International Court of Justice and reports from Amnesty International, U.S. military aid to Israel has been used to support acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing. This is not only unacceptable but, in my view, unconstitutional under American law.
These events present a serious test for the West’s claims about humanity, democracy, peace, and security. The world is watching to see whether those values are real—or just rhetoric. This is a defining moment: a clear line between democracy and hypocrisy. The entire Muslim world, without exception, in addition to progressive Jews and Christians, supports the creation of an independent Palestinian state.