The Fethullah Gülen Nebula: The Rise and Fall of an Unconventional Movement

Last update: 2025-06-09 12:03:45

Fethullah Gülen has died in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, where he went into voluntary exile in 1999. The founder and sole guide of a movement without parallel in Turkey or the Muslim world, Fethullah Gülen was a polarising figure throughout his life. Revered by some as a prophet, hated by others as the devil, he has inspired and forged a vast movement that is at once religious, economic, educational, media-oriented, longstanding and officially apolitical. But interfering in the shaping of a deep-rooted culture in this way betrays unspoken political ambitions. In fact, Fethullah Gülen was much more than a religious leader: he was a central political figure in Turkey over the last thirty years, albeit one who often lurked in the shadows.

Fethullah Gülen born in 1938 in a small village in Turkey’s very conservative province of Erzurum, established himself on the public stage at the same time as another rising figure in Turkish political Islam, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, sixteen years his junior. Despite their differences, the two men formed an alliance in 2002, when the AKP came to power. At the time, Gülen’s movement was already a major economic and religious force in Turkey. It had even exported itself beyond Turkey’s borders, from the Balkans to Central Asia, via the Caucasus, and was already spreading beyond. Benefiting from its alliance with Turkish diplomacy, it quickly became a competing and threatening force, unbalancing the power of the AKP and precipitating the break between the two leaders and their respective camps. Indeed, the seeds of division were already being sown in 2012, and open warfare tragically erupted in the attempted coup d’état in July 2016. Attributed to Gülenist forces infiltrated into the State’s secretive and coercive apparatus, the putsch not only failed to unseat Erdoğan, but it strengthened him and triggered an unprecedented purge aimed at the political and even physical elimination of thousands of Gülenists. The movement came out of this totally depleted. So, does the death of the leader condemn the little that remains of this movement? What legacy and influence does it leave behind in Turkish politics and culture, and in the future development of society and the country as a whole?

 

A Structurally and Strategically Ambiguous Movement

 

Defining and, above all, delimiting the Gülen movement is a delicate task, because since its beginnings, discretion and concealment have been the hallmarks of its strategy for escaping the surveillance of the Kemalist state. To understand it is to uncover the character and central personality of Fethullah Gülen. He was a simple imam working for the Diyanet, the official structure for managing Islam in Turkey, and gradually mobilised a circle of disciples around him throughout the country. The favourable economic and political context facilitated the formation of an initial multi-sector network. In the 1980s, as Turkey moved towards ultra-liberalism, the various currents of Islam were able to develop in the economic sphere, and Gülen’s movement began to focus on the field of education. In so doing, it won popular confidence and recognition in conservative Anatolian circles, eager to offer their children a better future. As a result, the movement was structured around thousands of educational foundations of all kinds, through which it trained thousands of disciples and amassed a great deal of money, the fuel needed to power the new liberal Turkey. This simple Islamic educational circle quickly passed under the radar of Kemalist vigilance and grew into a nebula of sympathisers and companies dedicated to spreading the master’s ideas throughout Turkey. The movement spread beyond the educational sphere into the business world and the media, with newspapers, television channels and radio stations spreading Gülen’s ideas throughout the country. At the time, being a Gülenist businessman meant investing and getting rich, in Turkey and elsewhere, by taking inspiration from Gülen’s ideas and putting them into practice. But what were these? How did the little imam from Erzurum differ from conservative religious leaders in winning over so many people’s consciences?

Fethullah Gülen’s uniqueness stems from his acute and idiosyncratic ability to adapt to the world’s changing circumstances, combining Islam, Turkish nationalism, modernism and liberalism. He theorised an Islamic ideology that was both nostalgic for an idealised Ottoman grandeur and vague about politics. Officially apolitical and non-partisan, Gülen nevertheless regularly appeared alongside the country’s leading political figures.[1] The latter understood the importance and benefits of maintaining good relations with Gülen, aware of his influence and the reach of his media networks, but also undoubtedly attracted by his ideas aimed at reconciling Islam and democracy, and advocating – as a strategy or in all sincerity? – peace, tolerance and harmony at home and abroad. But of all the Turkish politicians, only Erdoğan forged an alliance with the master, making him his preferred partner in running the country from 2002 onwards. What was the basis of this alliance, and what was its raison d’être?

 

The Union and Disunion of the Erdoğan-Gülen Couple

 

In the context of the time, this alliance initially appeared natural and beneficial to both camps. Erdoğan, the fiery young politician, and Gülen, the influential spiritual sage, had everything they needed to get along and benefit from each other without stepping on each other’s toes. Founded in 2001, the young AKP party was itself surprised by its electoral victory in 2002. Although Erdoğan was widely acclaimed and invited to lead the country, he lacked allies, particularly in the intellectual and media spheres. As for Gülen, he had long been suspicious of the secular Kemalist and military institutions, and chose to go into voluntary exile in the United States in 1999. From Pennsylvania, he now reigned supreme over his sprawling, transnational movement, which had become so powerful that it was difficult for him to resist the political siren song. For Erdoğan and the AKP, Gülen’s movement proved to be an invaluable partner: influential in intellectual circles, it was supported by numerous media companies, newspapers, schools and television channels, which praised and promoted the new conservative government. For example, the newspaper Zaman, the movement’s flagship daily, painted a positive portrait of Erdoğan and his work at the head of the country, in exchange for protection for the movement and a political agenda favourable to Gülen’s ideas and networks. With this backing and protection from the Erdoğan government, the Gülen movement was able to flourish and infiltrate the structures of power. Followers of Gülen obtained key positions in the structures of the administration, notably in the ministries of national education, the police, the justice system, and little by little in the army and the intelligence services. The term “infiltration” may seem abusive, but it is not, because many Gülenists, civil servants and servants of the state, were more loyal to Gülen than to the state. In other words, the aim was to recruit state agents from within. Admittedly, this was not a new phenomenon in Turkey, but the Gülenists succeeded on a massive scale, in an economic and political context that was very favourable to them. Denounced at the time by various observers,[2] the extent of this intrusion benefited from the blindness of those in power, thanks to the alliance sealed between Erdoğan and Gülen, and was only later raised to the level of a threat.

This alliance, which was real at home, continued abroad, in various post-socialist countries opening up to Turkish influence (the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia) as well as in Africa and even in the West. Gülen’s movement had set up a vast network of schools, colleges and universities, supported by businessmen’s associations and companies, which facilitated the development of genuine Turkish soft power, to the benefit of the AKP and Turkish diplomacy. In Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey’s policy of influence was largely the work of the Gülenists. In the United States and Europe, its networks built up a positive image of Erdoğan, open to dialogue and to the democratisation of his country. Strong as it was, this alliance, which had seduced many intellectuals, aroused the mistrust of the Kemalist circles most attached to the founding principles of the secular republic. In spite of everything, the army in power was weakened and discredited by decades of restraint on democratisation, by government measures to strengthen the civilian element to the detriment of the military[3] and by the aura that Erdoğan enjoyed in the West, particularly in the United States, for his model of “Islamic democracy.” And indeed, at the very beginning of the 2000s, Turkey was in almost insolent economic health, and was reassuring in its efforts towards democratisation and openness, seeming capable of appeasing the Muslim world with a moderate religious soft power, held within secular and liberal institutions and aimed at the whole of the Middle East and beyond.

However, the entente fizzled out. An analysis in hindsight, through the prism of the sociology of religion and power, shows that the break-up was inevitable because of the emancipation of each party, as their dissensions crystallised into rivalry. Reinforcing each other, their domination—one political, the other religious—ended up revealing deep divisions in both internal and external politics.

From the point of view of the AKP and Erdoğan’s camp, the Gülen movement had become too influential and too power-hungry. With their many networks at home and abroad, the Gülenists demanded ever more “quotas” of deputies on the AKP lists for the various elections. Bargaining is classic in Turkey between religious organisations, such as Sufi brotherhoods and political parties, but with Gülen’s power it reached unprecedented levels. The pressure became threatening, and the AKP, refusing to open the door any further, led the rivalry on substantive political issues that were far more concrete and crucial for the country, such as the Kurdish problem.

In his attempt to resolve the thorny Kurdish question, Erdoğan initiated a process of secret dialogue with the PKK. Although officially denounced as a terrorist movement, the PKK had become a key player in Kurdish society thanks to its hold on Kurdish society and its various organisations. Erdoğan decided to open secret talks between the Turkish intelligence services and PKK representatives in Oslo with a view to finding a political solution and putting an end to the armed struggle. But the Gülen movement, which is more nationalist than the AKP and closed-minded on this issue, opposed this strategy. And, to thwart this, it made public information about these secret talks in order to turn public opinion. In February 2012, while Erdoğan was in hospital for an operation, the Gülen movement, through one of its infiltrators in the judiciary, issued a warrant for the arrest of the head of the Turkish secret service, Hakan Fidan (now Minister of Foreign Affairs), for collusion with the PKK terrorist organisation. This attempt to arrest Hakan Fidan, denouncing the secret mandate to negotiate with the PKK, was clearly intended to bring about Erdoğan’s impeachment. But this was without considering the counter-attack by the government which passed a law protecting the head of intelligence, whose indictment cannot be made without the prime minister’s approval.

At the same time, by 2010, the disagreement had come to the fore in foreign policy, notably on the Israeli-Palestinian question. At the time, Erdoğan was still mediating between the Palestinians and Israelis, whose duplicity in the peace negotiations he denounced. He then adopted a harder political line towards Israel, and indirectly sent a humanitarian convoy from a Turkish NGO close to the government[4] to the Gaza Strip in May 2010, in an attempt to break the blockade and bring humanitarian aid to the population. The mission failed when the Israeli navy stormed the convoy, killing ten humanitarian activists on board. The incident triggered a serious political crisis between Turkey and Israel and its American allies, who criticised the Turkish initiative. Fethullah Gülen, who was already living in the United States where he enjoyed the support of American and pro-Israeli elites and circles, disassociated himself from Erdoğan’s pro-Palestinian policy, even judging it irresponsible. On Ankara’s side, the position was interpreted as an act of betrayal and an embarrassing encroachment on its foreign policy.

 

A Fratricidal Rivalry With no Winner

 

From 2012 onwards, the differences were so deep and irreconcilable that the alliance imploded and turned into a fratricidal conflict. Overestimating both their strength and influence at the heart of the government and Erdoğan’ s bad press on the international stage because of his intervention in Syria, the Gülenists stepped up their attacks on Erdoğan. And although Erdoğan had not waited until 2012 to counter the Gülenist threat within his own ranks, at home and abroad,[5] he had not counted on the soft contagion of the Arab Spring in Turkey. In June 2013, a vast social and political protest movement shook the Turkish political scene, undermining Erdoğan’ s popularity and giving the Gülenists a green light to strike a blow. Two moves deserve our attention here.

The first attack took place in December 2013, when gendarmerie officers close to Gülen searched the homes of Erdoğan and his son, finding millions of dollars in cash hidden in shoeboxes, revealing the extent of corruption in Turkey. The second attack intercepted arms lorries chartered by the Turkish special services, and therefore mandated by Erdoğan, and bound for Syria. The fact that their final recipients were never identified, because they were never delivered, did not stop the Gülenist media and other detractors of Erdoğan from accusing him of collusion with radical Islamists in Syria. Be that as it may, Erdoğan did not forgive these stabs in the back.

The public revelation of these affairs, with their international repercussions, was intended to bring down Erdoğan’ s power, to the benefit of the Gülen movement. Against all expectations, not only did the regime survive these scratches, but the wounded animal fought back furiously. Erdoğan purged the state of Gülenist moles. From the end of 2013, all those known for their closeness to Gülen who had joined the police, the army or the judiciary were transferred or dismissed. These large-scale, massive and disproportionate ‘ cleansing’  reprisals, often on the edges of legality, reached such a level of undermining to regain control of the state that they testify to the paranoid feverishness of the AKP elites and the vulnerability of power in these turbulent years. In an international context of Turkey’ s growing isolation, due to its intervention in Syria and the breakdown of the peace process with the Kurdish national movement, public political control became repressive, the media and opposition were muzzled, and the feeling of insecurity spread to people’ s consciences, weakening the government. PKK attacks resumed, forcing Turkey to launch military incursions into Syria, from where they were organised. In this climate of violence and repression, Erdoğan made new enemies in the various structures of the state, particularly in the ranks of the army. The army was thought to be reclusive in its barracks, but this was to overlook a long historical tradition of coups d’ état. Once again, the army intervened against the government. It is against this backdrop of events that the putsch of 15 July 2016 can be explained. The details of this failed operation remain unclear in many respects, but the analyses all point to the responsibility of certain sections of the army and military cadres affiliated to the Gülen movement. The attempt was so pitiful and the failure so flagrant that some do not hesitate to suspect that it was staged by Erdoğan himself to orchestrate a radical takeover of the institutions. Strengthened by this ordeal and more determined than ever to eradicate all forms of Gülenism in the country, he ordered a purge, even in the classrooms. As a result, tens if not hundreds of thousands of people were dismissed, imprisoned and many others forced into exile. But the crackdown was not confined to the Gülenist forces alone, and was extended, quite opportunely, to other oppositions with no connection whatsoever with Gülen, in particular to the liberal opposition and certain defenders of the Kurdish cause.[6] The purge also extended beyond the country’ s borders, although it had begun there before 2016.

Indeed, since the first Gülenist hostilities against the government in 2013, Turkish diplomacy has been tasked with undermining the movement’ s influence and power so that Gülen schools and other foundations are closed down. 2016 only served to accelerate and increase the pressure on the chancelleries and governments of host countries. Many gave in to Ankara’ s demands under pressure and intimidation. In a large part of the Caucasus and Central Asian states, and in most African countries, Erdoğan obtained the closure of Gülen’s assets. Only a few establishments remain in countries such as Nigeria and South Africa, in the name of their sovereignty and their rejection of Turkey’ s interference. In Western countries such as the United States, Germany and Belgium, where the authorities had nothing to reproach the movement for, the maintenance of these Gülenist structures constituted a form of aid to the victims of Erdoğan’ s authoritarian drift.

A decade later, eight years after the coup d’ état and with the recent death of Fethullah Gülen, a number of questions are being asked about the legacy and future prospects of the movement he created.

 

By way of conclusion: legacy and future prospects

 

Between its rise in the early 1990s and its eradication in 2016, the Gülen movement was a major player in Turkey’ s religious, cultural, media, economic and even political spheres. Its supporters still defend the services it has rendered to the country: the spread of moderate Islam in Turkey and around the world, its hybridisation with democracy and its contribution to the country’ s prestige. It is undeniable that its foundations have organised thousands of conferences and seminars to promote a tolerant Islam and dialogue between cultures and religions. However, their contribution to the democratisation of Turkey deserves some qualification and criticism. It is true that the Gülen movement’ s media contributed to the development of a civil society which, in partnership with the AKP government, improved the lot of ethnic and religious minorities. At the same time, however, the same Gülen disciples did not hesitate to fabricate accusations in order to purge the army of its Kemalist rivals and replace them with cadres linked to the movement. Moreover, there is room for doubt as to the sincerity of the motivation when an essentially secretive movement, which claims to be committed to democracy and freedoms, resorts to infiltration, recruitment and illegal wiretapping, as it did between 2012 and 2016, in the structures of the State in order to better take control from within.

On the other hand, the influence of the Gülenists on Turkey’ s soft power is indisputable. In Central Asia, the Caucasus, Africa and elsewhere, it was their networks that spread the language, religion and culture to a large number of countries where Turkey had traditionally had little influence. Almost ten years after this break, this legacy is still alive, particularly among certain African elites who are now Turkish-speaking and keen to cooperate and trade with Turkey.

Finally, regarding the future of the Gülen movement, even if it is difficult to read the Turkish coffee grounds, the succession is likely to be difficult. In Turkey, Erdoğan, still in power, is keeping up the pressure to eradicate it. Discredited everywhere else by Turkish diplomacy, including by Erdoğan’ s detractors, and tainted by secret motives of political subversion, Gülen’ s movement arouses the aversion of everyone in Turkey, and is struggling to regain the trust of the chancelleries and governments of the host countries.[7] The coup plotters have cast aspersions on the virtue of a movement that is supposed to be open, generous and tolerant. In Turkey itself, the violence of the putsch on the Turkish collective conscience has undermined the movement’ s image and reputation for a long time to come. Abroad, its assets have been reduced to too small a scale for it to have any hope of influencing the Turkish domestic scene. For the moment, it is licking its wounds and concentrating on helping the survivors of the purges.

What emerges is that Gülen and his clique have sinned through superiority and blindness: from the outset, the movement’ s strength and influence at home and abroad rested largely on the alliance forged with Erdoğan. To break this alliance, and even more so through betrayal, was to sign one’ s own death warrant. It was also to misunderstand and underestimate the power of President Erdoğan, while highlighting his autocratic and quasi-omnipotent drift.

More prosaically, the future of the nebula as such and the way in which it operates inspire a few concluding remarks. The sociology of religion teaches us that movements controlled and governed by such a charismatic figure of the guru type, as was the case with Gülen in his community, do not long outlive their founder. Gülen did not designate a successor, nor did he train and raise up any disciple worthy of the role from among those closest to him to continue his work. The management of the remaining network of schools, universities and businesses spread around the world would be entrusted to a collegial group, i.e. a council of four or five of the deceased master’ s closest and longest-serving collaborators. Time will tell whether a worthy offspring will emerge from the rump movement or whether it will implode amid too much dissension.

 

 

To find out more:

 

Bayram Balci, Missionnaires de l’ Islam en Asie centrale : Les écoles turques de Fethullah Gülen, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2003.

 

Joshua Hendrick, Gülen : The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World, NYU Press, 2013.

 

Hakan Yavuz, John L. Esposito (Eds.), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, Syracuse University Press, 2003.

 

Hakan Yavuz, Bayram Balci (Eds.), Turkey’ s July 15th Coup: What Happened and Why ? Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 2018.